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"A purpose, an intention, or design strikes everywhere the most 
careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened 
in absurd systems, as at all times to reject it." 
Philo, Dialogues 
ii 
PREFACE 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain how David Hume 
failed to establish in Part II of the Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion that the design argument, as presented by 
Cleanthes, is not a sound analogical argument. The scope of 
this thesis does not embrace a validation of the design argument. 
What we are concerned with is whether Hume is able to invalidate 
the argument in Part II of the Dialogues via its analogical form. 
It is Hume's contention, expressed in Part II of the 
Dialogues, that the design argument, as presented by one of the 
leading characters, Cleanthes, is not a sound analogical argument. 
Hume uses Clean.thee to state and defend the design argument while 
he employs Philo to express his own philosophical views. 
Cleanthes' defense of the argument from design is based on the 
logical mode of analogical reasoning. Philo thinks that he can 
refute the design argument as advocated by Clean.thee, and he 
attempts to do just that by attacking the analogical form of t~e 
argument. 
In Chapter II we will examine the argument from design, as 
presented in Part II of the Dialogues by Cleanthes, in light of 
analogical reasoning. This 'will enable us to determine what the 
analogical form of the design argument is, and the logical 
criteria that could be employed for evaluating the argument. In 
Chapter III we will present Hume's refutation of the design 
iii 
argument which is based on the contention that the logic of 
analogy employed in the design argument is faulty. Chapter IV 
will comprise a critical analysis o:f Hume's attempt at refuting 
the design argument as presented by Cleanthes, in light of the 
criteria presented in Chapter II for evaluating analogical 
arguments. Our analysis will reveal that Hume's objections to 
the analogical mode of argumentation in the design argument are 
not sufficient to support his evaluation of the argument from 
design as not being a sound analogical argument. 
To my knowledge, after a thorough investigation of the 
subject comprising this thesis, I have only found one philosoph-
ical source that resembles this thesis. Alvin Plantinga, in 
the chapter entitled 11 The ·Teleological Argument," from his book 
God and Other Minds, maintains that Hume's philosophical 
criticisms of the formal logical structure of the design argu-
ment are not conclusive enough to dismiss it as having no 
"logical force." 
This thesis can be shown to have both similarities and 
differences to A. Plantinga's. The similarities consist of 
refuting Hume's conclusion from his critique of the design 
argument in Part II of the Dialogues, and employing the technique 
of logical analysis in our refutation. The dissimilarities are 
manifested in the nature of our refutation. Unlike Plantinga 
who attempts to establish that the inference from the design 
' 
argument, as presented by Cleanthes in Part II of the Dialogues 
has some "logical force," I am not interested in validating the 
degree of probability for the inference. The other dissimilarity 
iv 
is a matter of a formal logical analysis of the analogical mode 
of the design argument as presented and criticized by David Hume. 
At this time I would like to thank my advisory committee, 
Professor Edward Maziarz and Dr. James Godar, for the unselfish 
use of their time and knowledge. Also, my wife, Sandy, for 
her continuously increasing encouragement and good humor in 
typing and proofreading this manuscript. 
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C1I.AP1'ER I 
BRIZF HISTORY 01'' THE DESIGU ARGtn•llil\f'.i: 
The design argument has always been the most popular of 
theistic arguments, tending to evoke opontaneous assent in simple 
and sophisticated alike. Man perceives the universe as an 
orderly system. Events have been recurring in regular sequences. 
Tho observation of a...~ orderly pattern in one region of existence 
is found to be nicely adjusted to that of another, and both to 
conform to an over-all design. .All annhilation of this order 
would make scientific knowledge impossible and human life even 
more precarious than it is. In familiar objects near at hand, 
particles of matter too small to be seen are said to be moving 
in orbits similar to those traced out by remote planets. It is 
said that if even one particle of matter were destroyed, the 
entire universe would be annihilated, so delicate are the 
adjustments of this infinitely complex universe. 
Such considerations have lead naturally to the idea of a 
designer who must be credited with having planned the cosmos. 
As early as the fifth century B.c., Anaxagoras attributed the 
working of the universe to a Mind or Intelligence.1 In the 
fourth century B.C. Plato alpo sought to show that the order and 
1see Joseph Owens, A History of Western Philosophy, 
PP• 122-24. 
1 
2 
harmony exhibited in the world sprang from the action of mind. 
His argument entails the notion that all the activity and change 
in the world originated from a supreme mind which moves itself 
and creates subordinate souls or gods, the heavenly bodies. 
The outerrr:ost sphere of the universe is set in motion by the 
direct action of the changeless, transcendent God.2 
kristotle, in the same era, propounded a more emphatic 
teleological or purposive view of nature in which the members 
of the hierarch,y of natural classes i.n the universe seek to 
realize their perfections according to their sta-t;ions. 
Aristotle's views presuppose a rational design, a universal 
aspiration to f'ulfillment, and in one passage he describes God 
as the perfect being whom all things desire.3 
1
.rhe theological perspectives of Greek views of nature 
passed into the later view of medieval science and were readily 
translated into Christian thought.4 Dt. Thomas Aquinas, during 
the thirteenth century, offered a typical statement of what 
came to be called the argument from design. The central thrust 
of St. Thomas' argument is that things in nature regularly act 
in certain ways in order to accomplish some useful purpose: 
they act for the best, both with respect to their own welfare 
and to that of other beings who depend upon them. But in most 
instances, the thing concerned is obviously not aware of the 
3;Javid Hoss, Aristotle, PP• 179-86. 
4Robert H. Hurlbutt III, :rume, Kewton, and the Design 
Argument, PP• 116-26. 
3 
purpose for which it acts: it is not acting intentionally or 
intelligently at all. "Therefore some intelligent being exists 
by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this 
being we call God. 11 5 
Like st. J:homas' other "proofstt of God's existence, the 
argument from design reappeared in new versions in the writings 
o~ the early modern philosophers. A classic statement of the 
modern argument from design is to be found in Part II of 
David Hume's Dia1ogues Concerning Natural Religion. The form 
of the argument from design, as presented in the Dialogues 
persisted into the nineteenth century in the writings of Paley 
and so many others, and survives in popular and semi-popular 
forms to the present,day.6 
The philosophical perspective of nature adopted after 
the rise of science in the seventeenth century, was reflected 
in the logic of the modern d~sig.n argument. The new philosophy 
of nature abandoned belief in the intrinsic teleology of 
physical objects. 
Thus the modern argument from design is not a teleological 
argument of the Aristotelian type. That is, it does not 
consist in the thesis that the natural order, with which man 
is integrally bound up, fulfills an end of absolute and 
intrinsic worth.7 
5Thomas Aquinas, Sum.ma Thcologica, Pt. I, Question II, 
art. 3, Great Books of the Western World, trans. by Fathers of 
the English Dominican Province, revised by Daniel J. Sullivan, 
' XIX, 13. 
The 
from Design," Philosophy: 
Philoson , XLIII, 
No. 
7navid Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed., 
with an introduction, by Korman Kemp Smith, p. 28. 
4 
"It is an essentially anthropormorphic type of argument," 
Horman Kemp Smith asserts, "resting upon an alleged analogy 
between natural existences and the artificial products of human 
contrivance. 118 It was maintained by the users of this argument 
that we could gain a sufficient basis for the existence and 
conception of God as an ordering intelligence in our knowledge 
of the self and of its relation to the products which it 
consciously designs.9 
David Hume's treatment of the design argument in the 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is widely hailed as a 
r:iasterpiece of philosophical criticism. "Hume's destructive 
criticiDm of the argument," says Norman Komp Smith, in his 
introduction to Hume's Dialogues, "was final and complete."10 
11
.And there is much to be said for the estimate," Alvin Plantinga 
states in his book, God and Other Minds, :for "Hume's discussion 
is matchless for clarity, imagination, and grace."11 
10 Ibid., P• 30. 
-
11Alvin Pla.ntinga, God and Other Minds, p. 97. 
CHAPTER II 
CLEANTHES' ARGUMENT 
The Logic of the Design Argument 
Certain important questions are raised by David Hume at 
the very beginning of his examination of natural theology in 
the Dia1ogues.1 What can be demonstrable by reason in matters 
of theology? Are the methods of reasoning in theology different 
from those of common life and of science? Is there a 
possibility of utilizing scientific knowledge about nature, 
and the methods of observation, as basis for interring the 
existence and attributes of God? Cleanthes, in direct response 
argues that theological reasoning does not differ in method 
and assurance from scientific and practical reasoning; and in 
support of these contentions, he presents the following argument 
in Part II of the Dialogues: 
Look round the world: Contemplate the whole and every part 
of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, 
subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which 
again admit of subdivisions, to a degree beyond what human 
senses and facilities can trace and explain. All these 
various 1D4chines, and even their most minute parts, are 
adjusted to each other with an accuracy, which ravishes 
into admiration all men, who have ever contemplated them. 
The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all 
nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the 
productions of human contrivance; of human design, thought, 
wisdom, and intelligenceJ Since therefore the effects 
resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules 
of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the 
Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man; 
though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned 
to the grandeur of the work, which he has executed. By 
1Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, pp. 137-38. 
5 
6 
this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do 
we prove at once the existence ~f a Diety, and his similarity 
to human mind and intelligence. 
The quintessence of the stated argument from design is 
the contention that design or an adaption of means to end can 
be explained only in terms of an intelligent being or designer. 
In order for something to be a machine or manufactured item, so 
the argument reads, it must have a composition of parts, each 
performing a special function which contributes to the over-all 
purpose {telos) of the thing in question. There is another 
characteristic mentioned above which is equally necessary if a 
thing is to be called a machine: the means-end relationship 
(or teleological order) typifies a product of design, thought, 
wisdom, and intelligence. Since both human artifacts and the 
universe are characterized by this property their causes must 
be intelligent as well. 
The design argument as stated may be put schematically as 
follows: 
1. The productions of human contrivance are the products of 
intelligent design. 
2. The universe resembles the productions of human contrivance. 
3. Therefore probably the universe is a product of intelligent 
design. 
4. Therefore probably the author of the universe is an 
intelligent being. ' 
7 
Analogical Reasoning 
In examining the above argument from design it is evident 
that the key factor in the argument is its form--the analogical 
form that it employs. Analogical arguments are a species of 
an inductive argument which involve inferences to unotservable 
portions of the past or present or to the future based on past 
experience of similar events. Arguments from analogy have 
the following general form: 
1. Analogue A tested or observed for properties b, c, and d 
have these properties. 
2. .Analogue A1 is similar to Analogue A in having properties 
b and c. 
3. Therefore probably Analogue A1 as yet untested or observed 
for property d has this property. 
Analogical reasoning is employed in most of our everyday 
inferences and is also widely used in scientific inferences. 
Thus we infer that the next course we take from a particular 
instructor will be interesting from the fact that both of 
two courses taken from the instructor were interesting. Based 
on the evidence that we got good wear from shoes previously 
purchased from a particular store we infer that the next pair 
of shoes we purchase from the same store will wear well. 
Professor Swinburne describes the logical form common 
in scientific inferences, which essentially entails an 
analogical structure. 
A's are caused by B's. A*s are similar to As. Therefore--
given that there is no more satisfactory explanation of 
the existence of A*s--they are produced by B*s similar to 
Ba. B*'s are postulated to be similar in all respects to 
8 
B's except insofar as shown otherwise, viz. except insofar 
as the dissimilarities between A's and A*'s force us to 
postulate a difference •••• 
He furnishes the following scientific example to illustrate the 
above. 
Certain pressures (A's) on the walls of containers are 
produced by billiard balls (B's) with certain motions. 
Similar pressures (A*'s) are produced on the walls of 
containers which contain not billiard balls but gases. 
Therefore, since we have no better explanation of the 
existence of the pressures, gases consist of particles (B*'s) similar to bi~liard balls except in certain 
respects--e.g. size. 
Swinburne is aware that similar arguments used by 
scientists that have argued for the existence of many 
unobservables become weaker " ••• insofar as the properties which 
we are forced to attribute to the B*'s because of the differences 
between the A's and the A*'s become different from those of the 
B's."4 An example of this type is the nineteenth century 
physicists postulating the existence of an elastic solid, aether, 
to account for the propagation of light. The outcome was that 
the light being propagated resulted in such differences that 
the physicists had to affirm that if there was an aether it 
possessed many peculiar properties not possessed by normal 
liquids or solids. Hence their conclusion was that the 
probability of the inferred existence of aether was very weak.5 
All of the evidence compiled in support of analogical 
inferences cannot guarantee phat the arguments are certain, or 
3swinburne, "The Argument from Design," 205. 4.rbid. 
5rb1d. 
9 
demonstrably valid. None of their conclusions follow with 
"logical necessity" from their premises. It is even logically 
possible that one fire may burn but not another. At the same 
time it must be remembered that no argument by analogy is 
intended to be mathematically certain. Analogical arguments 
are not to be classified as either "valid" or "invalid." 
Probability is all that is claimed for them. 
Cleanthes' Argument Viewed in Light 
of Analogical Reasoning 
Although no argument by analogy is ever "valid," in the 
sense of having its conclusion follow from its premises with 
logical necessity, some are more cogent than others. Analogical 
arguments may be appraised as establishing their conclusions 
as more or less probable. At this time we shall outline the 
criteria which are applied to arguments of this type. We will 
then discuss the criteria in light of the analogical reasoning 
in the stated argument from design, in order to determine what 
logical criteria might be used for evaluating the probability 
of the argument. (This will help us, as we shall see in 
Chapter IV, to evaluate Hume's objections to the analogical 
form of the design argument as stated by Cleanthes.) 
The criteria for evaluating analogical arguments consist 
essentially of three elements: (1) the number of similar 
properties that have been obperved between objects or analogues, 
(2) the number of similar instances in which the properties 
of analogues have been observed, and (3) the relevant ways in 
which the properties of analogues are said to support the 
conclusion of analogical arguments. 
10 
The analogues of "sheets" and "towels" are employed below 
to illustrate how the probability of analogical inferences can 
be affected by the number of similarities that the properties 
of analogues have in common. 
The fact that sheets and towels are alike in being 
cotton, white, and flat provides a good basis for 
arguing that they will be alike in further character-
istics of being well-laundered. If we could add more 
characteristics that we know they have in common such 
as size and weight of material, this would add to the 
worth of the argument •••• 
If you discover a sufficient degree of diff erenoes between the 
properties of "well-laundered" items the probability of the argu-
ment would decrease. 
If the towels have fancy lacework and the sheets do not, 
or if the sheets were silk and the towels cotto~, then 
the probability of the argument would deorease.6 
Another example employing the analogues of "shoes" illustrates 
the importance of determining the strength of analogical arguments 
by sufficient number of similar characteristics that the proper-
ties of the analogues have in common, 
That a new pair of shoes was purchased at the same store 
as an old pair that gave good wear is certainly a premise 
from which it follows that the new shoes will probably 
give good wear also. But the same conclusion follows 
with greater probability if the premises assert not only 
that the shoes were purchased from the same store, but 
they were manufactured by the same company, that they 
sold for the same price, that they are the same style, 
and that I plan to wear them in the same circumstances 
and activities.? 
' The following is an illustration that depicts two instances 
of analogical inferences admitting of different degrees of 
6itobert Sha:nvy, Logic an Outline, p. 110. 
?Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, p. 344. 
11 
probability based on the number of observable instances in which 
the properties of analogues or events have been said to be 
observed. 
If I advise you not to send your shirts to such and such 
a laundry because I sent one there once and it came back 
ruined, you might caution me against "jumping to conclu-
sions," and urge that they ought to perhaps be given 
another chance. On the other hand, if I give you the 
same advice and justify it by recounting four different 
occasions on which unsatisfactory work was done by them 
on my clothing and report further that our mutual friends 
Jones and Smith have also patronized them repeatedly with 
unhappy results, these premises serve to establish the 
conclusion with a great deal higher probability than dSd 
the first argument which cited only a single instance. 
It should be noted that the differences between the degrees of 
certitude is not a simple numerical ratio between the number of 
instances and the probability of the conclusion. Numerical ratios 
are employed in the frequency theory of probability and the cal-
culation of probabilities but not with the probability associated 
with analogical arguments. 
An examination of the above analogical arguments reveals 
that the number of differences or similarities between the 
properties of the analogues together with the number of instances 
in which these properties had been observed had a bearing on the 
probability of the analogical inferences. The examples presented 
thus far have all been fairly good examples, because the analogies 
have all been relevant. But it is commonly agreed on that it is 
difficult to know in general, or even in some particular cases, 
exactly which things are relevant and which are not. 
As Kahane states, "Even the room in which a course is to be 
8 
.I.2!S·· pp. 343-44. 
12 
taught may be relevant to how interesting it will be. (For 
example, it would be relevant if the teacher in question disliked 
large, poorly lit rooms, and the next course he teaches happens 
to be in such a room.)•$ Professor Alvin Plantinga, in agreement, 
asserts that: 
For naturally enough the members of any class resemble 
each other in some respect; the problem is to specify 
how much and in what respect the members of the sample 
class must resemble those of the reference class, 
minus the sample class.10 
The following illustration depicts how an analogical inference 
supported on a single relevant analogy connected with a single 
instance will be more cogent than one which depicts a dozen 
irrelevant points of resemblance between its conclusion's instance 
and over a number of instances enumerated in its premises: 
Thus a doctor's inference is sound when he reasons that 
Mr. Black will be helped by a specific drug on the 
grounds that Mr. White was helped by it when a blood 
test showed exactly the same type of germs in his system 
that are now in Mr. Black's. But it would be fantastic 
for him to draw the same conclusion from premises that 
assert that Smith, Jones and Robinson were all helped 
by it, and that they and Black all patronize the same 
tailor, drive the same make and model car, have the same 
number of children, had similar educations, and were all 
born under the same sign of the zodiac.11 
Although the difficulty is present it is still maintained 
that in rractice we employ the criterion of relevancy in either 
evaluating or formulating analogical arguments. As Plantinga 
states: 
9Howard Kahane, Logic and Philosophy, PP• 269-?0. 
lOPlantinga, God and Other Minds, P• 105. 
11copi, Introduction to Logic, P• 347. 
13 
Still, even if we cannot give the rules for detecting 
relevant differences or for determining appropriate de-
grees of similarities we are able to do this in practice; 
the fact is that we often recognize, as in the case of 
some of the arguments mentioned, that the sample class 
does not resemble the reference Qlass minus the sample 
class in the relevant respects.12 
How could we evaluate Cleanthes' argument from design, which 
is an analogical argument? We could begin by maintaining as Cle-
anthes does that the universe is similar to human contrivances in 
that both exhibit a "curious adapting of means to ends," and that 
there is a considerable number oi instances of design observed in 
the world to support the probability of an intelligent designer 
of the universe. For example, Arthur I. Brown, a contemporary 
writer, refers to the ozone in the atmosphere which filters out 
enough of the burning ultra-violet rays of the sun to make life 
as we know it possible on the earth's surface. He states: 
The Ozone gas layer is a mighty proof of the Creator's 
forethought. Could anyone possibly, attribute the device 
to a chance evolutionary process? A wall which prevents 
death to every living thing, just the right thickness, 
and exactly the correct defense, gives every evidence 
of plan.13 
Another contemporary writer, Richard Taylor, refers to the homeo-
stasis or self-regulation of our bodies, which serves as a safe-
guard for maintaining the proper balance between internal and 
external forces acting upon it, as an instance of design. 
The homeostasis or self-regulation of our own bodies, 
for instance, whereby vhe body manages to maintain the 
12Plantinga, God and Other Minds, P• 105. 
13Arthur I. Brown, Foot~rints of God, cited by John Hick, 
Philosopb.y of Religion, p. 2 • 
14 
most unbelievable internal harmony and to adapt itself 
to the most diverse and subtle forces acting upon it, 
represents a wonder which human art cannot really14 duplicate and our science only dimly comprehends. 
Taylor also suggests the same type of' teleological order in the 
embryological development of' living things. "The same type ot 
order and seemi~ goal-directed change is apparent in the embry-
ological development of living things. 1115 
Again Albert Einstein refers to "• •• the sublimity and mar-
velous order which reveals themselves both in nature and in the 
world of' thought."16 Even Philo, later in the Dialogues, con-
cedes that the universe certainly seems initially to resemble 
things we know to be designed; the impression that the universe 
has been designed is hard to avoid: "A purpose, an intention, or 
design strikes everywhere the most careless, the most stupid 
thinker; and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems, as at 
all times to reject it. 1117 Kant thinks the analogy ot the known 
parts of the universe to the products of design is sutticient to 
support such argument and moreover better than any thing else at 
hand. "Jrut at any rate we must admit that, if' we are to specify 
a cause at all, we cannot here proceed more securely than by anal-
ogy with those purposive productions of' which alone the cause and 
mode of action are fully known to us. 018 
14Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, p. 95. 
( 
l5Ibid. 
-16Albert Einstein, "A Scientist•s Cosmology," in Philosophy 
in the Age of Crisis, ed. by Eleanor Kuykendall, P• 436. 
l?Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, P• 214. 
18Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, cited by Plantinga, 
God and Other Minds, p. 106. 
15 
Mill thinks that the adaptations of means to ends in nature 
afford a high degree of probability in favor of an intelligent 
cause or designer for the ord.erful universe. As he states: 
Leaving this remarkable speculation to whatever fate 
the progress of discovery may have in store for it, I 
think it must be allowed that, in the present state 
of our knowledge, the adaptations in Nature afford a 
large balance of probability in favour of creation by 
intelligence.19 
The difficult problem that we would have in evaluating the 
argument from design would be to determine whether the property 
of design was a relevant characteristic or property to support 
the inference in the argument with any degree of probability at 
all. In order to assess this problem we might begin by recalling 
the purpose of the argument from design. The telos of the 
design or teleological argument is to establish the synergistic 
relation between design and designer (teleos and techne) in 
both human contrivances and the universe. As W. P. Alston 
rightly points out: "This is the heart of the teleological argu-
ment--the claim that adaptation can be explained only in terms 
of a designer."20 
In conjunction with the above, John Stuart Mill maintained 
the design or purpose in the universe was a relevant character-
istic in the design argument because there is some connection 
through causation between design in nature and its causal origin. 
l9John Stuart Mill, "The Argument from Design," in Philosopb_z 
in the Age of Crisis, ed. by Kuykendall, p. 488. 
20william P. Alston, "Teleological Argument for the Existence 
of God," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, VIII, 85. 
16 
As he states, "• •• the argument is greatly strengthened by 
the properly inductive considerations which established that 
there is some connection through causation between the origin 
of the arrangements of nature and the ends they fulfill."21 
Of course, it might be argued that the universe does not 
resemble some man made products. "True enough, the universe 
does not greatly resemble a spring loom or a golf club. 1122 It 
may even be that the universe resembles an animal or a plant 
in some respects more than the products of human contrivance, 
as Hume suggests in his second half of the critique of the 
design argument. This, however, is not enough to disqualify 
the design argument, since plants and animals themselves, as 
well as some of their parts, exhibit the property of design: 
the curious adaptation of means to ends. As Plantinga states: 
This, however, is not to the point, since plants and 
animals themselves (as well as some of their parts) 
have the reference property: they too, exhibit the 
curious adaptation of means to ends. ]Jes for 1xam-
pie1 are often cited as having this property.2' 
What has to be kept in mind at this point, as R. G. Swin-
burne observes is that "All analogies break down somewhere, 
otherwise they would not be analogies."24 In saying that the 
relation of analogue A to property B is analogous to a relation 
ot analogue A1 to a postulated characteristic B1 , we do not 
21m11, "The Argument from Design," p. 488. 
22Plantinga, God and other Minds, p. 106. 
23Ibid. 
24Swinburne, "The Argument from Design," p. 209. 
l? 
claim that A1 is in all respects like A, and Bl is in all respects 
like B. The degree of similarities or differences between A and 
A1 , and Band B1 is built into analogical arguments. For the 
degree of support for analogical arguments, as was pointed out 
above, is directly related to the similarities or differences 
between the types of evidence available. 
The final outcome of this objection concerning the rele-
vancy of design as being a sufficient characteristic or property 
to support the probability of the conclusion in the argument 
from·design can be construed as Plantinga suggests as a query: 
are the admitted differences between the universe and things 
we know to be designed minus the similarity between the ana-
logues, (which is established on the basis of the "curious adap-
ting of means to ends" exhibited in both cases) sufficient to 
support the inference in the argument with any strength at all?25 
Since the object of this work precludes the validating of the 
argument from design, we have only to inquire whether Hume has 
furnished the necessary answer to this question. 
Since it is Hume's evaluation of the design argument that 
is under consideration we would do well to consider exactly what 
Hume's job entailed! 
To begin with, Cleanthes postulated the similarity between 
the universe and things we know to be designed on the basis of 
' 
the "curious adaptating of means to ends" exhibited in both 
analogues. What Hume could have done, since he challenged the 
25Plantinga, God and Other Minds, p. 206. 
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validity of Cleanthes•s argument, was to account for the differ-
ences between the two analogues. 
Next he might have observed the actual instances of design 
said to be exhibited in the world as well as in artificial pro-
ducts of contrivance. If he was able to point out only a limited 
number of instances of design in the world he would have had 
substantial support for his conclusion that the argument from 
design is not a sound analogical argument. This is evident 
because the degree of support for analogical arguments is propor-
tional to the number of similar instances said to have been 
observed between the properties of analogues. 
Although Hume might have pointed out the differences between 
the universe and things we know to be designed, this by itself 
would not have supported his evaluation. He would still have had 
to consider the characteristic which they have in common, i.e., 
the "curious adapting of means to ends." If he did consider 
this similarity he might have explained how the property of 
design was not a relevant characteristic to support the conclu-
sion in the design argument. In order to accomplish this he would 
have had to explain how the differences between the universe and 
things we know to be designed override the force of the similar-
ity between the analogues, via design, to vitiate the argument. 
CHAPTER III 
HUME'S ATTEMPT AT REFUTATION 
The design argument, "• •• as honest and straightforward 
as a Norman Rockwell painting,"1 as Plantinga describes it, was 
placed precariously on Hume's drawing board tor evaluation. 
The problem that challenged Hume with the design argument, Nor-
man Kemp Smith asserts, is "• •• the question whether the argu-
ment from design, as an argument from analogy, can allow of 
being formulated in a tenable manner. If • • • "This indeed,'' Mr. 
Smith continues, "is the thesis with which the Dialogues are 
primarily concerned, and to which they give what amounts to a 
definitely negative answer. 112 
Hume sketched his critique of the design argument in two 
discernible parts. In the first part of his critique, which 
appears in Part II of the Dialogues, Hume does not explicitly 
address himself to the theistic nature of the intelligent de-
signer of the universe. The design argument as stated by Clean-
thes in Part II of the Dialogues and rebuked by Philo describes 
the cause of the teleological order or adaptation of means to 
ends in the universe as only a very intelligent being or 
designer. This is because the analogy in the argument is not 
' 
intended to support additional inferences. As Mr. Smith states 
1Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds, P• 95. 
2David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, p. 56. 
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in his introduction to the Dialogues: "Before this argument 
could be taken as establishing the existence of the God of reli-
gion, it had ot course to be supplemented by other types of 
argument. These, however, are supplementary to the argument 
trom design."3 
It is only in the second halt of his critique ot the argu-
ment from design, which occupies the latter part of the Dialogues, 
that Hume addresses himself to the additional inferences to the 
theistic nature of the intelligent cause of the universe. In so 
doing he employs his reductio ad absurdum. arguments in order to 
explain the following. Even if we grant that the analogy 
employed in the design argument as stated by Cleanthes is sound, 
and that is .! posteriori, one can, by precisely the same methods 
of analogy and from the same kind of evidence, deduce a number of 
conclusions about the proposed cause ot the world that are 
remarkably obnoxious to those who accept traditional religious 
doctrines. The world is disorderly as well as orderly, hence 
implies a disorderly cause; the world is tull of evil as well 
as beneficent purposive-relationships, and hence implies an evil 
cause; machines and houses are otten made by many artisans, 
hence the world has multiple causes--many gods. In other words, 
in the absurdum arguments Hume shows that analogical arguments 
of precisely the same form ~nd of equal validity demonstrate 
conclusions radically at variance with those accepted by the 
users of the design argument who want to argue the following: 
3 Ibid., P• 29. 
-
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(1) the designer or creator of the universe is omniscient, omni-
potent, and perfectly good; and (2) the creator of the universe 
is an eternal spirit, without body, and in no way dependent upon 
physical objects. 
As I have mentioned earlier the scope of this work embraces 
only the first part of Hume's critique of the design argument. 
With this in mind we shall proceed to examine Hume's critique of 
the argument from design in Part II of the Dialogues. 
Before beginning his evaluation of Cleanthes's argument, 
Philo, Hume's mouthpiece, informs Cleanthes of his understanding 
of Cleanthes' argument. 
~ e!.Perience we find (according to Cleanthes) that ••• W! Throw several pieces of steel together, without ape or form, they will never arrange themselves so as 
to compose a watch. Stone and mortar, and wood, without 
an architect, never erect a house. But the ideas in a 
human mind, we see, by an unknown, inexplicable oeconomy, 
arrange themselves so as to form the plan of a watch or 
house. • • • Experience, therefore, proves, that there 
is an original principle of order in mind, not in matter. 
From similar effects we infer similar causes. The 
adjustment of means to end isalike in the universe, as 
in a machine of human contrivance. The causes, there-
fore, must be resembling.4 
Philo's critique of the design argument begins immediately 
afterwards. "Now it is clear," Robert Hurlbutt correctly points 
out, "that the key factor in the design argument is its form--
the analogical form of inference that it employs--and therefore 
it is natural that it is the main part of Hume's attack."5 
' Philo contends that the design argument is not a sound 
4 ~., p. 146. 
5aobert H. Hurlbutt III, Hume, Newton, and the Design Argu-
~' p. 150. 
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analogical argument. "The dissimilitude," Philo states, between 
the design argument and a sound analogical argument, "is so 
striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a 
conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause; and how 
that pretension [the inference drawn in the design argument to 
an intelligent designer for the universe] will be received in 
the world, I leave you to oonsider. 116 
There are three central objections, which will be developed 
in order, that Philo levels against the design argument in Part 
II of the Dialogues in support of his eva+uation ot Cleanthes• 
argument. 
(1) The design attributed to the world as a whole cannot be 
interred from particular oases of design found in the world, 
hence it cannot be employed as an instance to establish the 
similarity between the universe and things we know to be 
designed. 
(2) Since the world is one particular, not a member of a 
species a great number of whose members have been observed, 
it cannot be employed as an analogue or subject in the 
analogical argument from design. The world being a parti-
cular, is unique; it is on the surface not a member of the 
class of machines. 
(3) Since no one has eieen the origin of one world, let alone 
"worlds" we do not have the requisite instances of similar-
ity to support the conclusion to an intelligent being or 
6Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, p. 144. 
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designer of the universe. 
The first objection that Philo levels against the design 
argument is based on his contention that no whole can resemble 
its parts or some set of its parts sufficiently to support an 
analogical argument. As he states: 
But can a conclusion, with any property, be transferred 
from parts to whole? Does not the great disproportion 
bar all comparison and inference? From observing the 
growth of an hair, can we learn anything concerning the 
generation of a man? Would the manner of a leaf's blow-
ing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruc-
tion concerning the vegetation of a tree?? 
The above passage viewed in light of Philo's direct criti-
cism of the design argument, can be understood as follows. Philo 
wants to argue that since the operation or adaptation of means to 
end in the universe is represented as the design or teleological 
order of the universe as a whole it cannot be logically employed 
as an instance to establish the similarity between the universe 
and things we know to be designed. This is evident, Philo insists, 
because we would be inf erring the design or purpose of the uni-
verse as a whole from particular cases of design found in nature, 
and we cannot do this: "• •• the operation of one part of nature 
upon another for the foundation of our judgement concerning the 
8 origin of the whole ( ••• can never be admitted) •••• 
Philo follows this objection with one that does take into 
consideration the nature o~ the relevant whole. 
When two species of objects have always been observed 
to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the 
existence of one wherever I see the existence of the 
........ 
7 Ibid., p. 14? • 
............. 
8 ~., P• 148. 
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other: And this I call an argument from experience. 
But how this argument can have place, where the objects, 
as in the present case, are single, individual, without 
parallel or specific resemblance, may be difficult to 
explain. And will any man tell me with a serious coun-
tenance, that an orderly universe must arise from some 
thought and art, like the human; because we have exper-
ience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were 
requisite, that we had experience ot the origin of 
worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have 
seen ships and cities arise from human art and contri-
vance. 9 
All cases, Philo is arguing in the above passage, in which we 
analogically argue from effects to causes must refer to (a) 
effects of exactly a similar nature, effects which can be shown 
to belong to members of the same species; and (b) the causes 
as well as the effects of the analogues must be experienced. 
That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the 
earth has solidity, we have observed a thousand and a 
thousand times; and when any new instance ot this nature 
is presented, we draw without hesitation the accustomed 
inference.10 
But, in the design argument of Cleanthes, which says that the 
world is a machine, we do not have the requisite experience of 
similarity. The world is a particular; it does not belong to a 
species; it is unique; it is on the surface not a member ot the 
class of machines. Further, in machines, houses, etc., the 
cause ia observed, time after time, to be responsible tor the 
effect. But in the design argument this condition does not hold. 
Since we have no such experience of the origin of worlds, "• •• 
I( 
will any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly 
universe must arise from some thought and art, like the hum.an; 
because we have experience of it?rtll 
9 
.!£!A., PP• 149-50. 10 ~· t p. 144. 11 Ibid., PP• 149-50. 
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Cleanthes, in the midst of the argument just referred to, 
insists that if Philo's strictures are accepted, then Galileo's 
argument concerning the earth's motion is invalid. "• •• a 
caviller might raise all the same objections to the Copernican 
system, which you have urged against my reasonings. Have you 
other earths, might he say, which you have seen to move? 
Have. • • • Ph.ilo's response is quick: 
Yesl ••• Is not the moon another earth, which we 
see to turn round its centre? Is not Venus another earth, 
where we observe the same phenomenon? Are not the revo-
lutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of 
the same theory? All the planets, are they not earths, 
which revolve about the sun? Are not the satellites 
moons, which move around Jupiter and Saturn, and along 
with these primary planets, round the sun? These analo-
gies and resemblances, with others which I have not men-
tioned, are the sole proofs of the Copernican system: 
And to you it belongs to consider, whether you have any 
analogies of the same kind to support your theory.13 
Note that according to Philo's point on observing causes and 
effects, Galileo's argument would offer a hypothesis, rather than 
a proof--it is the "sole" proof, according to Philo. But the 
similarities observed between the earth and the moon, etc., are 
full and complete. Both are members of the species of planets, 
and there is evidence enough to justify a high degree of proba-
bility in the hypothesis that the earth moves, Cleanthes, Philo 
observes, does not have such evidence at his disposal. The 
world is not experienced to be the effect of either a machine 
' or a work of art. Both sorts of inference involve an argument 
to a first cause, and therefore both are subject to Philo's 
criticism that neither involves the observation of causes. 
12~ •• p. 150. 
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Nobody has seen the origin of worlds. 
Can you pretend to show any such similarity between the 
fabric of a house and the generation of a universe? Have 
you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles 
the first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever 
been formed under your eye? And have you had leisure to 
observe the whole progress of the phenomenon, from the 
first appearance of order to its final consummation? If 
you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your 
theory.14 
Now Philo, in the quotations abovet clearly proposed one 
sort of test for analogical arguments--the standard of observa-
tion with respect to the relationship of causes and effects. 
The hypothesis that the world is the product of intelligent 
design, is caused by a designer-mechanic-purposer is verified 
by observing that worlds are created by designers. But, we find, 
no worlds-in-creation have been observed. Since this key aspect 
of analogical (scientific) reasoning is missing--the experience 
necessary to correct analogical inferences from effects to causes 
--we can only proceed .! priori; and "For ought we can know .! pri-
ori, matter may contain the source of spring of order, origin-
-
ally, within itself •••• "15 "This eventuality," R. H. Hurlbutt 
observes, "came to pass, almost on the heels of Hume's suggestion, 
in Darwin's theory of evolution."16 
In conclusion, Philo's critique of Cleanthes's argument 
from design can be viewed in terms of the following three rejec-
tions. He begins by (1) r&jecting the design or the adaptation 
of means to ends, which is attributed to the universe as a whole, 
14Ibid., P• 151. l5Ibid., P• 146. 
- -16liurlbutt, Hume, Newton, and the Design Argu?J!ent, p. 153. 
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being an instance that can be employed to establish the similarity 
between the universe and things we know to be design. Next he 
rejects (2) the use of the universe being used as an analogue or 
subject in a sound analogical argument. Finally he rejects (3) 
the inference to the universe being a product of intelligent 
design because of the lack of instances in which there has been 
an observation of worlds being created. 
Philo's reasons for the above three contentions rest on the 
following arguments. In regards to (1) Philo argues that no 
whole can resemble its parts or some set of its parts sufficiently 
to support an analogical argument. Since the design which is 
attributed to the world is designated in the design argument as 
the design of the universe as a whole, it cannot be used to 
establish the similarity between the universe and things we know 
to be designed; this is evident because the inference is based on 
particular cases of design found in nature and this would involve 
an argument from parts to whole. Philo's reason for (2) is based 
on his assumption that all cases in which there is an analogical 
inference from effects to causes they must refer to effects which 
can be shown to be of exactly a similar nature; this can only be 
established by showing how the effects belong to members of the 
identical species. Philo's contention in (3) rests on his conten-
tion that in order to draw~n analogical inference of a cause for 
any effect it is necessary to have experienced the cause and 
effect in conjunction. Since no one has seen the intelligent 
designer responsible for the design of the universe in the process 
of designing or creating, Cleanthes cannot draw his inference to 
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an intelligent designer who would be responsible for the design 
of the universe. Since the world is unique the user of the design 
argument cannot maintain that the world is similar to or belongs 
to the species of machines of human contrivances, thus it cannot 
be employed as an analogue in the design argument. 
In the next and final chapter we will learn that Hume's 
(Philo's) critique of Cleanthes' argument was not adequate to 
support his thesis. This will be established by explaining how 
Hume's three basic assumptions and arguments in support of the 
same are neither conclusive nor accurate enough to evaluate the 
argument from design as stated by Cleanthes, as not being a 
sound analogical argument. 
r 
CHAPrER IV 
HUME'S FAILURE AT REFUTATION 
David Hume sat in the open-air theatre, disguised as a 
critic by the name of Philo, listening to a monologue by a char-
acter named Cleanthes. The content of the speech was similar to 
what he had heard several times before. It concerned the nature 
or character of the world and its parts pointing most clearly 
to the existence of some very intelligent being or "guiding hand," 
that is, to some purposeful being responsible tor the ordertul 
universe. A universe, according to w. B •. Yeats, in which man is 
not afraid that anarchy will be loosed upon it. 
They !!Z !.!!.! .!!!.! thins, Hume whispered to himself, ~ 
we find !.! n2i !. !!.!£!. srain g1_ ~' !!.2!: .! gonglomeration g! 
these .2.£ similar things .!!2£ !. chaos. We find an order and har-
- - - --
~ !g, sai nothins £.!. !!:!! m:ysteri ~ complexit1 ££, things ~ 
.5?.!!£ profoundest science ~ learnins ~ only barely !g, pene-
trate. After the monologue was completed Hume went home to write 
his critique. This chapter will critically analyze that critique, 
and attempt to prove that it does not establish what it purports. 
In order to facilitate this critical analysis of Hume's cri-
tique there will be a review of each specific criterion that Hume 
If 
might have employed in order to support his evaluation of Clean-
thes' argument from design in Part II of the Dialosues in conjunc-
tion with his objections to the stated argument. This in turn 
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will be followed by a critical analysis to determine whether or 
not Hume's objections are (1) conclusive enough to encompass 
sufficient answers to the key questions for evaluating the design 
argument, or (2) accurate enough by themselves to invalidate the 
argument. 
The first criterion that Hume might have employed in his 
critique of Cleanthes• argument was to determine what the dissi-
milarities were between the universe and human contrivances. 
Out of the three central cbjections to the logic of the design 
argw:rient Hume's second objection seems to be related to the 
above problem, if only in an indirect way. 
He argues that the universe or world cannot be employed as 
an analogue in the argument from design because there is no way 
to establish the similarities, nor for the fact, the differences 
between the properties of the world and human contrivances. 
Hume's reference to this point was made in conjunction with 
Ph.ilo's comparison of the analogical argument in support of the 
Copernican system with that of the design argument. 
As Philo stated: "Is not the moon another earth, which we 
see to turn around its center? • • .Are not the revolutions of 
the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same theory?"1 
The reference to Galileo was specific: "But Galileo, beginning 
with the moon, proved its &;i.milarity in every particular to the 
earth; its convex figure, its natural darkness when not illumi-
nated, its density, its distinction into solid and liquid, the 
1David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, p. 150. 
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variation of its phases •••• 112 What are the analogues that we 
can compare with the universe Philo asked Cleanthes. Without 
giving Cleanthes time to answer Philo answered his own question--
there aren't any! The world is a particular, not a member of a 
species a great number of whose members have been observed. 
Therefore, Philo inferred that the world cannot be employed as 
a sub~ect in the design argument, because there aren't any points 
of comparison that could be made between the world and human con-
trivances (or anything else, presumably); the world is unique; 
it is on the surface not a member of the class of artificial con-
trivances. 
As we can see Hume did not elaborate on the differences 
between the world and human artifacts. Instead, he maintained 
the impossibility of the task. The universe being unique, Hume 
implies, negates the possibility of it being compared with any-
thing else. 
Although Hume does not answer the first critical question 
necessary to support his evaluation of the design argument, does 
the fact that the universe or world is unique or single affect 
the argument? The design argument would seem to be affected by 
the world being unique only if there was no reference class or 
property to which both the universe and other things could refer 
to. As Alvin Plantinga states the problem: 
How does the fact that the universe is single affect the 
argument? It would seem to be relevant only if it implies 
that there are no classes of which the universe is a 
2 Ibid.' p. 151. 
member (or perhaps no classes which contain it and other 
things), and hence no reference class for the argument •• • • 
Th.ere are reference classes or properties to which the universe 
and other things can refer to, Plantinga continues, and rightly 
concludes on this basis, that Hume's objection to the uniqueness 
of the universe does not invalidate the argument: 
But, of course, there are any number of classes to which 
both the universe and many other things belong: the 
class of very large things, for example, or things more 
than fifty years old. The mere fact that a thing is 
unique does not of course entail that it has no property 
in common with anything else.' 
The fact that the universe is single or unique, 
therefore, does not invalidate the argument.4 
Hence Hume's contention that anything unique precludes the 
possibility of it being compared with anything else is categori-
cally wrong. As R. G. Swinburne states: "Nothing describable is 
unique under all descriptions (the universe is, but the solar 
system, a number of material bodies distributed in empty space) 
and everything describable is unique under some desoription."5 
After all Cleanthes has established the similarity between the 
universe and things we know to be designed on the basis of an 
adaptation of means to ends. 
Furthermore it might also be noted that Hume's gecond objec-
tion suggests that we are not allowed to draw conclusions about 
objects which are the only one of its kind. If this iP the case, 
' R. G. Swinburne maintains, we would have to discredit the results 
of cosmologists who are reaching scientific conclusions about the 
3Alvin Plantinga. God and Other Minds• P• 101. 
4Ibid. 
-
5R. G. Swinburne, "The Argument from Design," 208. 
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universe as a whole, because it is the only one ot its kind. We 
would also have to discredit the arguments by physical anthropo-
logists about the origin of our human race, because there is not 
supposedly other human races at this time to make comparisons 
with. As he states the objection: 
The other objection which seems to be invalid in 
the above passage is that we cannot reach conclusions 
about an object which is the only one ot its kind, and, 
as the Universe is such an object, we cannot reach con-
clusions about the regularities characteristic of it 
as a whole. But, cosmologists are reaching very-well 
tested scientific conclusions about the Universe as a 
whole, as are physical anthropologists about the ori-
gins ot our human race, even though it is the only 
human race of which we haye knowledge and perhaps the 
only human race there is.6 
Since Hume was not able to support his evaluation of the 
design argument by either employing the first criterion tor 
evaluating analogical arguments or by establishing that the 
universe could not be used as a subject for a sound analogical 
argument, let us see if he employed the second criterion tor 
evaluating analogical arguments. The second criterion that 
Hume could have employed to support his evaluation ot the design 
argument was to determine that the number of observable instances 
established between the property of design in productions of 
human contrivances and the universe were not sutticient to sup-
port the inference stated in the argument. 
Hume took a "crack" at, this problem with his first objec-
tions, while he circumnavigated the problem in his second objec-
tion. Philo had argued in his first objection to the design 
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LISRAR'f 
argument that the design attributed to the world as a whole 
cannot be used as an instance by Cleanthes to establish the simi-
larity between the universe and things we know to be designed. 
This was thought to be evident according to Philo because the 
teleological order of the universe as a whole would have to be 
inferred from particular cases of design exhibited in the world, 
and this would mean that we would be arguing from parts to whole 
which cannot be done according to him. 
There are two points to be discerned in Hume's first objec-
tion. First Cleanthes had not only postulated the design of the 
universe as a whole, but he had also referred to the instances 
of the "curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature." 
Secondly, Philo's objection rests on his assumption, as Plan-
tinga states, "that no whole can resemble its parts (or some set 
of its parts) sufficiently to support an analogical inference."? 
In regard to the first point, even if we were not able to 
establish that the design of the universe as a whole was not a 
relevant instance of design to establish in the argument from 
design, we would still have the individual instances of design 
in the world to possibly support the conclusion in the design 
argument. F. R. Tennant, arguing this point, asserts that the 
inference in the argument from design would not be limited due 
to our lack of knowledge of the world as a whole. As he states: 
' 
The knowable world, however, is not identical with 
the universe as to which, as a whole, we have no know-
ledge. It may be objected, therefore, that to use the 
phrase "the world'' to denote both of these seems to be 
?Plantinga, God and Other Minds, p. 98. 
' 
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a vital question. Of course, if trustworthy evidence 
of design in the limited portion of the universe that we 
know were forthcoming, a world-designer would be "provedA" 
and our ignorance as to other parts would be irrelevant.o 
In regard to the second part mentioned above about Hume's 
assumption that no whole can resemble its parts, or some set of 
its parts sufficiently to support an analogical inference, we 
have only to examine an argument of this type to determine the 
general validity of this assumption. As Plantinga argues if 
we were to infer that the North Cascades Wilderness Area itself 
probably contains seven or more Douglas firs to the acre based 
on our knowledge that large parts of the North Cascades Wilder-
ness Area contain more than seven Douglas firs to the acre we 
would be arguing from parts to whole, and be justified. Hence 
Hume's assertion, Plantinga continues, that we are not justified 
in arguing from parts to whole is false. What we would have to 
consider he maintains in each case is the specific whole at 
parts in question. As Plantinga states the objection: 
Philo, • • .apparently suggests that no whole can resem-
ble its parts {or some set of its parts) sufficiently to 
support an analogical inference. But surely this is not 
so. I know large parts of the North Oasoade Wilderness 
area contain more than seven Douglas firs to the acre 
(and have no contrary evidence); I can reasonably con-
clude that the North Cascades Wilderness Area itself pro-
bably contains seven or more Douglas firs to the acre. 
On just the information cited, my conclusion certainly 
seems to be more probable than not. The general conclu-
sion that one cannot properly argue from parts to whole 
is false. Everything depends upon the specific whole 
and parts in question:9 
8F. R. Tennant, "Cosmic Teleology," in Classical and Contem-
pora91 Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. by John HlcK, 
P• 2 • 
9Plantinga, God and Other Minds, p. 98. 
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Hence since Hume did not accept the conclusion that we can 
argue from parts to whole depending upon the specific whole and 
parts in question, he did not bother to investigate the ways that 
we could possibly argue in the case from the observable instances 
of design in the world to the design of the universe or world as 
a whole. Therefore he cannot conclude to the impossibility or 
the same, which means that his objection to the design or the uni-
verse as a whole, being an instance in which we could compare 
with human contrivances, is inconclusive. 
While Hume pointed his first objection in the direction of 
evaluating the instances that have been said to be established 
between the design in the universe and things we know to be 
designed, he sailed around the problem with his third objection. 
Instead of indicating the lack or sufficient instances in which 
the design in the world could be compared with artificial pro-
ducts of contrivances to sufficiently support the conclusion in 
the argument from design, Hume maintained in his third objection 
that there were not enough observable instances ot the origin of 
worlds. This point was brought out when Philo argued that the 
design argument was not scientific in that it ottered no evidence 
tor the cause of the world order. In order to draw an inference 
ot a cause tor any effect it is necessary, Philo insisted, to 
have observed the cause an<\ effect in conjunction--and no one 
has seen the origin or one world, let alone "worlds." Therefore 
Philo concluded ! priori, since no ! posteriori evidence is 
available concerning the cause of the world, it may have caused 
itself. The doctrine of evolution provided precisely the filling 
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for this cavity, arguing that natural selection provides a "law" 
which explains how the world and the organisms in it took on 
their torm. 
Although Hume did not answer the question whether there was 
not an adequate number of instances in which the design in the 
world could be compared with human contrivances; let's see whe-
ther Hume's third objection invalidates the stated argument from 
design. Briefly Hume has argued that one can only inter trom 
an observed A to an unobserved B when we have frequently obs•rved 
A's and B's together. Hence we cannot inter trom the adaptation 
of means to ends in the universe to an unobserved intelligent 
designer on the analogy of the connection between observed cases 
of design in human artifacts and human agents, unless we have 
observed at other times other designers in the process of creat-
ing or designing other worlds. 
"This argument, ••• " Swinburne points out, ''reveals Hume's 
inadequate appreciation of scientific method."lO Scientists 
have been making conclusions about the origin ot the universe 
even if they haven't experienced the origin. They have also been 
arguing to the existence ot many other unobservable things which 
have not been previously experienced, based on the similarity of 
the analogues in question. Even Philo's example of Galileo's 
inference to the rotation pf the earth is an example of this type 
or argumentation. No one had actually seen the rotation of the 
earth when the inference was made. As Swinburne states: "As we 
saw in the scientific examples which I cited a more developed 
10swinburne, "The Argument from Design," 208. 
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science than Hume knew has taught us that when observed A's have 
a relation R to observed B's, it is often perfectly reasonable 
to postulate that observed A*'s, similar to A's have the same 
relation to unobserved and unobservable B*'s similar to B's."11 
Mr. Plantinga in basic agreement contends that Hume's " • • • 
suggestion is too strong; it implies that we could make no sound 
inductive inference concerning the origin, tor example, of the 
largest crow in the Amazon jungle, since we obviously cannot 
have had experience of various largest crows in the Amazon. 012 
Since Hume's contention that we can only infer from an ob-
served effect to an unobserved cause when we have frequently 
observed identical eff eots and causes together is a misnomer in 
the logic of scientific reasoning, and at the same time in the 
logic of analogical reasoning in general, his second objection 
does not seem to invalidate the argument from design. A further 
point can be made at this time. Since Hume's third objection 
lacks the support to vitiate the design argument, Hume was not 
able to substantiate his claim that there was no ~ Rosteriori 
evidence available concerning the cause of the world. Hence his 
conclusion that "• •• aught we can know~ priori, matter may 
contain the source or spring or order originally, within itself, 
••• 
1113 fails to have any impact. 
Before moving on to t~e last area of this thesis, let's 
11Ibid. 
-12Plantinga, God and other Minds, P• 99. 
l3Hume, DialoS'!es Concerning Natural Religion, p. 146. 
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briefly speculate on Hume's hypothesis or a self-caused world 
which Darwin picked up and was thought to have made a convinoing 
case tor. Besides the notion that "The survival of the fittest 
presupposes the arrival or the fit, ••• "14 there are other con-
siderations that make Darwin's theory less obvious than it seems. 
Richard Taylor points out that a consideration or any living 
thing whatever indicates that its power and construction are 
perfectly adapted to its mode of life. As he states: 
A hawk, for example, has sharp talons, rapacious beak, 
keen eyes, strength, and a digestive system all perfectly 
suited to a predatory mode of life. A lowly spider has 
likewise precisely what is needed in order to entrap its 
pray in artfully contrived snares. So it is with every 
creature whatever. • • • 
Now, as Darwin suggests, Taylor concludes: 
One can, of course, insist that it is only because such 
beings are so equipped that they pursue the goals that 
they do, and deny that they are so equipped in order to 
pursue those goals, just as one can insist that it is 
only because a man is carrying rod and reel that he goes 
fishing, and deny that he is carrying the equipment in 
order 1D tish; but this seems artifical even it one 
gives the evolutionary theory of Qrigin of such crea-
tures everything that it claims.15 
Now that our detour has led us back to the main highway of 
this work, let's see if Hume has followed the last road sign 
needed to terminate his trip. As we have observed Hume did not 
as yet follow the directions needed to reach his goal, nor was 
he able t.o reach it by his own private roads. 
out 0£ the three criteria necessary for evaluating the 
design argument, the last criterion, as stated earlier, is the 
14Tennant, "Cosmic Teleology," P• 295. 
15R1chard Taylor, Metaphysics, p. 95. 
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most difficult to employ. Even after being satisfied that we 
had established the sufficient similarity between the universe 
and things we know to be designed, on the basis of an adapta-
tion of means to ends exhibited in both analogues, and the suffi-
cient number of instances in which this characteristic had been 
observed between the analogues to support the conclusion of the 
argument from design, we still would have the problem of relevancy 
to contend with. We would have to explain in what relevant ways 
the property of design was said to support the conclusions of our 
argument. 
In the case of Hume's evaluation he would have had to explain 
how the property of design was not relevant to support the con-
clusion in the argument from design. If he would have given the 
answer to this problem he could have supported his evaluation 
(and thus reached his goal) but we can see that in order to have 
furnished an answer he would have bad to indicate the differences 
between the universe and things we know to be designed. This was 
important, as was revealed earlier, because in order to determine 
that the design or "curious adapting of means to ends" was not a 
relevant characteristic to support the inference in the argument 
from design, one would have to explain how the differences between 
the analogues were sufficient to vitiate the argument. 
Since we have exhaustei Hume's objections to Cleanthes' argu-
ment in Part II of the Dialogues, and have discovered that Hume 
did not point out the differences between the universe and things 
we know to be designed, we can state categorically, as Plantinga 
41 
confirms, that "Hume has given us no answer to the question."16 
Further, we can also conclude that Hume has not given us any 
answers in Part II of the Dialogues that are sufficient to sup-
port his evaluation of Cleanthes' argument trom design as not 
being a sound analogical argument. 
16Plantinga, God and Other Minds, P• 106. 
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